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Some have argued that a significant decrease in the demand for money, due to 
financial innovations, could imply that central banks are unable to implement 
effective monetary policies. This paper argues that central banks are always able to 
influence the economy’s interest rates, because their liability is the economy’s unit of 
account. In this sense, central banks “rule the roost.” In the 1930s, starting from 
Keynes’s ideas and referring to money in general, Kaldor had followed a similar line 
of analysis. 
In principle, a new unit of account could displace conventional money and, 
hence, central banks. But this process meets relevant obstacles, which essentially 
derive from the externalities and network effects that characterize money. Money is a 
“social relation.” Money and central banks are the outcome of complex social and 
economic processes. Their displacement will occur through equally complex 
processes, rather than through mere innovation. 
 
JEL Classifications: E41, E42, E52, E58 









In the last few years, there has been a growing concern about the “future of money.”
1 
In a world characterized by intense processes of financial innovation, many of which 
are related to advances in the field of information and communication technology 
(ICT), money “as we know it” could be replaced by some other instrument in its 
fundamental functions. The discussion on the future of money has been carried out 
from several different perspectives. Of particular interest is the discussion of the 
effects of financial and technological innovations on central banks and monetary 
policy.
2 In modern economies, conventional money and central banks are inherently 
connected to one another. If innovation brings about a significant reduction in the 
demand for money, this may imply an equally significant weakening of the central 
banks’ ability to affect the behavior of the economy through monetary policy. The 
present paper looks at the debate on the future of money and its implications for 
central banking and monetary policy. This issue is discussed by concentrating on its 
more general aspects, rather than on the technicalities of the implementation of 
monetary policy in economies characterized by intense processes of financial 
innovation. 
Some regard recent financial innovations as a threat to the central banks’ 
ability to affect the behavior of the economy through their policies. Financial 
innovations determine a declining demand for conventional money and, in particular, 
for base money in the form of banks’ reserves at central banks. As a consequence, it is 
argued, central banks could meet increasing difficulties in their attempts to affect the 
economy through changes in interest rates. Alternatively, others argue that, even in an 
extreme and unrealistic situation in which the demand for reserves vanishes 
altogether, central banks would still be able to implement monetary policy by 
influencing the economy’s interest rates. The possibility for central banks to always 
affect market interest rates derives from the fact that they do not necessarily have to 
control interest rates through variations in their supply of reserves. Central banks, 
                                                 
1 In the last years, several books with a title that contains “the future of money” have been published in 
English; see, for example, Dorn (1997), OECD (2002), Cohen (2004). 
2 In 2000, the journal International Finance, organized a symposium on the future of monetary policy, 
in which most of the participants looked at the effects of the “ICT revolution” on central banking.  
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instead, can directly fix an interest rate on their liability and affect all the other rates 
without having to change the supply of reserves. 
The ultimate reason why central banks can operate in this way is that their 
liability, i.e., base money, is the economy’s unit of account or standard of value, 
which has no inherent equilibrium value, unless it is determined by the central bank 
through its policy. The central banks’ ability to fix an interest rate that affects the 
whole economy can be expressed by saying that they “rule the roost.” 
The use of the notion of “ruling the roost” in the present context is not casual, 
but is related to an earlier debate on money and its properties. In the 1930s, Keynes 
had used the term to point out that the money-interest rate is the crucial variable that 
affects the interest rates on all other assets and, hence, the behavior of the economy as 
a whole. Kaldor developed Keynes’s idea in a critical way and showed that money 
rules the roost because it is the economy’s unit of account. Thus, the idea that the 
essentiality of money — and, hence, of central banks — ultimately derives from it 
being the economy’s unit of account can find an inspiration also in the Keynesian 
tradition, while participants in the current debate, like Woodford, find it in Wicksell. 
Emphasizing the function of money as the economy’s unit of account has 
relevant implications. In the “world in which we live”, characterized by uncertainty 
about the future and by the crucial role played by institutions, trust and confidence, 
the function of money as the unit of account is inextricably linked to its function as 
the economy’s ultimate means of payment. This, in turn, implies that the demand for 
base money remains positive and, in some circumstances, it can rise to a significant 
extent. Such situations occur when the degree of trust and confidence among agents 
declines significantly so that they demand the instrument that can be trusted more 
because it is guaranteed, though indirectly, by the state. This is an aspect that has not 
been given sufficient attention by many participants in the current debate on money 
and monetary policy. 
In principle, the instrument that currently functions as the unit of account, and 
is administered and issued by the central bank, could be displaced by a new 
instrument, administered and issued by an institution other than the central bank (e.g., 
a private bank or firm). This process of displacement, however, meets relevant 
obstacles, which essentially derive from the network effects and externalities that  
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characterize money. Money is a “social relation.” The emergence of money, both as 
unit of account and as medium of exchange, is the outcome of a social and economic 
process, rather than the outcome of technological innovations and the optimizing 
behavior of individual agents. Therefore, the displacement of money cannot be the 
result of spontaneous market processes or mere technological progress. The same line 
of reasoning can be followed with regard to central banks. Financial innovations 
related to technological advances per se do not represent a threat to the central banks. 
The existence and importance of central banks are explained as the outcome of 
complex historical, social, and economic processes; hence, their demise cannot be 
simply the result of spontaneous processes triggered by innovation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two summarizes the contemporary 
debate on central banks and monetary policy. Section three looks at aspects of 
Kaldor’s contribution to the debate on the properties of money and relates them to the 
current discussion on central banking. Section four presents considerations on the 
nature of money in relation to the possibility that it can be displaced by the emergence 
of new instruments and/or technologies. Finally, section five draws some conclusions. 
 
II. MONETARY POLICY IN A “WORLD WITHOUT MONEY” 
 
In traditional “textbook models,” the central bank determines the economy’s interest 
rate by varying the supply of money, the demand for which is assumed to be a 
sufficiently stable function. By varying the supply of money, the central bank creates 
a gap between the amount of money that the public wishes to hold and the amount 
that is available in the economy. Equilibrium in the money market is restored by 
changes in the interest rate. The IS-LM model is the most popular representation of 
this idea of how central banks operate (White 2001). 
The above description of how central banks realize their target rate faces a 
difficulty. Although there is a considerable consensus on the actual ability of central  
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banks to implement effective monetary policies, that is to say, to affect interest rates,
3 
many observe that the value of transactions in which they are engaged in advanced 
economies is too small a percentage of total transactions to be able to have significant 
effects on interest rates. Benjamin Friedman (1999) underlines this difficulty and 
proposes an explanation of why central banks can affect the economy’s interest rates, 
even though they engage in a relatively small volume of transactions. 
Central banks can implement effective monetary policies because of the 
special nature of their transactions. Any transaction in securities made by a central 
bank implies a variation in the commercial banks’ reserves, which is not true for all 
the other participants in the market. The central bank is a monopoly supplier of 
reserves. For Friedman, whatever is the adopted view of monetary policy, the central 
bank’s effectiveness depends on it being the monopoly supplier of reserves.
4 In 
particular, the central bank’s monopolistic position is also crucial when it operates 
through “moral suasion,” i.e., by signaling to the market its intention to vary interest 
rates at some date in the future. In this context, the market responds to the central 
bank’s signal by changing its expectations about future rates, so that it is the market 
itself that produces the variation in interest rates, without any engagement of the 
central bank in actual transactions. 
In order for the mechanism described above to work, the central bank’s signal 
must be credible, which is true only if the bank can actually vary short-term rates 
when the announced time to do so comes and the market has not yet responded in the 
expected way. On the grounds of his explanation of why central banks affect interest 
rates in the current situation, Friedman examines the processes that can represent a 
threat for the central banks’ effectiveness. Advanced economies can evolve to a 
                                                 
3 The notion of effectiveness used here is limited. The central bank’s monetary policy is said to be 
effective if it can influence short-term market rates. It is not an object of this paper to further 
investigate either the way in, and the extent to, which changes in short-term interest rates affect longer-
term rates or the extent to which changes in interest rates in general produce significant changes in the 
real sector of the economy (output, employment, etc.). 
4 In the “monetary view,” the public demands bank-issued money, against which commercial banks 
must have reserves at the central bank. When the central bank changes the supply of reserves, banks 
must change their supply of money to the public and changes in the interest rate follow. In the “credit 
view,” the public demands loans from banks, which create money by lending. The banks’ demand for 
reserves is positively related to the volume of their lending. If changes in the demand for reserves are 
not matched by changes in their supply by the central bank, there must be changes in the amount of 
bank loans, with consequent variations in interest rates.  
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situation in which central banks become monopoly suppliers of something for which 
the demand has vanished or has been greatly reduced. 
Due to financial innovations, both the demand for bank money and for bank 
credit are declining significantly (Friedman 1999), and so the demand for reserves is 
diminishing as well. If the demand for reserves keeps on declining, at a certain point 
central banks would no longer be able to affect the economy’s interest rates — 
changes in the supply of reserves would not produce any significant change in market 
interest rates. This is what Friedman calls “decoupling at the margin,” i.e., changes in 
the variables controlled by central banks would not give rise to corresponding changes 
in the relevant variables for the economy as a whole (Friedman 2000). In such a 
world, the monopolistic nature of central banks would no longer be relevant: “being a 
monopolist is of little value if no one needs, or even wants, to have whatever the 
monopoly is of” (Friedman 1999). Central banks could not exert their influence 
through moral suasion: “with nothing to back up the central bank’s expressions of 
intent (…), in time, the market would cease to do the central bank’s work for it” 
(Friedman 2000). 
Woodford (2000; 2001; 2002; 2003) opposes Friedman’s viewpoint. For 
Woodford, the central bank can also implement an effective monetary policy in a 
world in which the demand for base money is nil.
5 Even in this highly unrealistic 
world, the central bank can influence the entire constellation of short-term interest 
rates by paying an interest on the commercial banks’ reserves with it. In the world 
depicted by Woodford, commercial banks would not have to clear through the central 
bank’s settlement balances, i.e., demand reserves with the central bank, but could 
adopt different systems of clearing. Banks regard balances with the central bank as 
useful as any other equally riskless overnight investment. Therefore, their demand for 
reserves with the central bank would be nil at any interest rate higher than the 
settlement cash rate and horizontal at any rate equal to or lower than the settlement 
cash rate. In other words, banks hold balances at the central bank only if the overnight 
rate is lower than the central bank’s rate paid on settlement balances. In this 
framework, if the central bank changes its rate, the market rate has to change as well, 
                                                 
5 In his writings, Woodford also considers more realistic cases in which the demand for base money 
(reserves) is small but still positive.  
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because otherwise there would be an excess demand (supply) for market liquid assets, 
eliminated by arbitrage (Woodford 2001). 
The crucial question is why the central bank is always able to fix the interest 
rate on its liability. For Woodford, the central bank can always fix the interest rate on 
its liability because there is no inherent equilibrium value for a fiat unit of account, 
like the “dollar” (the central bank’s liability), unless a particular value is determined 
through the monetary policy commitments of the central bank itself (Woodford 2000). 
A contract promising to deliver a certain amount of dollars at a certain date implies a 
payment in terms of settlement balances at the central bank, or in terms of some kind 
of payment that the payee is willing to accept as a suitable equivalent. In any case, 
settlement balances at the central bank define the value of whatever is contractually 
accepted as payment: “Even in the technological utopia imagined by the enthusiasts of 
‘electronic money’ — where financial market participants are willing to accept as 
final settlement transfers made over electronic networks in which the central bank is 
not involved — if debts are contracted in units of a national currency, then clearing 
balances at the central bank will still define the thing to which these other claims are 
accepted as equivalent” (Woodford 200). 
The value of a dollar deposit with the central bank cannot be anything other 
than a dollar. This is not true of instruments of private financial institutions, which 
can offer liabilities that promise to pay a certain amount of dollars in the future but 
must accept the market’s present evaluation of such liabilities. Even if these liabilities 
were not perfect substitutes for other financial instruments, private financial 
institutions could not determine both the value and the nominal yield of their 
liabilities, whereas the central bank can determine both the value of its settlement 
balances in existence and the nominal yield on those balances. This is the fundamental 
reason why the central bank can affect short-term rates without engaging itself in 
large transactions. 
Friedman is not convinced by Woodford’s argument. For him, central banks 
can implement effective policies because “market participants know that, under 
current circumstances, the central bank can make the interest rate whatever it wants 
— if necessary, by engaging in very large transactions — and as a result those large  
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transactions are not necessary.” (Friedman 2000).
6 However, Friedman seems to 
underestimate that the possibility of arbitrage between reserves and other overnight 
investments makes the central bank’s engagement in large transactions unnecessary; 
as soon as the rate on reserves is varied by the central bank, the market makes the 
other rates change in step. In other words, the market anticipates that the demand for 
borrowed reserves is going to change and adjusts the other rates rapidly, before the 
central bank is “forced” to engage in large transactions. In a sense, the possibility of 
arbitrage works in a similar way to the central banks’ moral suasion. If anything, the 
arbitrage effect is stronger than moral suasion — markets do not have to believe in the 
central bank’s announcement to change interest rates; it is sufficient that they respond 
by acting in a maximizing way. Thus, in conclusion, in so far as their liability is the 
economy’s unit of account, central banks “rule the roost” — the rate that they can fix 
affects other market rates. 
 
III. WHY MONEY “RULES THE ROOST” 
 
To ground the effectiveness of central banks’ monetary policy on the fact that their 
liability is the economy’s unit of account recalls some aspects of Kaldor’s treatment 
of the own-rates of interest, which Keynes had introduced in chapter 17 of The 
General Theory (1936). As is well known, Keynes argued that money “rules the 
roost” because the interest on it sets a limit to the level of employment that the 
economy can realize. It is so because the interest rate on money is the most reluctant 
to decline as the stocks of all assets increase. If it is assumed that the yield of assets is 
                                                 
6 Friedman also argues that there is an inconsistency in Woodford’s analysis. Friedman carries out his 
reasoning in terms of the IS-LM model. Since, along the IS function, the equilibrium interest rate is 
undetermined, the central bank can fix it at whatever level by appropriately positioning the LM 
function. However, the IS-LM model is based on the hypothesis that the demand for money is defined 
for a zero (or fixed) interest rate on money itself, so that it is an inverse function of the interest rate on 
the alternative asset(s). If the rate on money changes in step with the rate on other assets, the demand 
for money is no longer a function of the interest rate and, therefore, the LM function becomes vertical. 
This does not mean that interest rates in the economy cannot be fixed by positioning the LM function, 
but a vertical LM function contradicts Woodford’s argument, for which it should be horizontal, because 
the central bank should be ready to borrow and lend any amount at the rate it fixes (Friedman 2000). 
For a similar criticism, see also (Lahdenperä 2001). Friedman’s arguments, however, seem to show the 
inadequacy of the IS-LM model to deal with such issues, rather than a flaw in Woodford’s line of 
analysis.  
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a decreasing function of their quantity, the equilibrium quantity of all assets is 
determined by the asset’s yield that is fixed, or highly sticky; the production of all the 
other assets will not be pushed beyond the level at which their yield equates the 
“sticky yield.” For Keynes, money “as we know it” (unit of account, medium of 
exchange, and store of value) has such properties that make it the asset whose yield is 
sticky.
7 However, for him, the roost also could be ruled by another asset that is not the 
economy’s unit of account; for example, land, whose elasticity of production is nil 
(Keynes 1936). 
Kaldor (1980) criticizes Keynes’s position and argues that the fundamental reason 
why money rules the roost is that it is the economy’s unit of account. Kaldor 
considers the two following notions of interest rate already used by Keynes. 
 
i)  The own-rate of own-interest, which is the asset’s yield in terms of itself. 
 
ii)  The own-rate of money-interest, which is the own-rate of own-interest 
corrected by the expected asset’s appreciation/depreciation in terms of money. 
 
The own-rate of own-interest of the i-th asset is given by (qi – ci – ri), where qi is the 
yield of the i-th asset in terms of itself, ci is the i-th asset’s carrying cost and ri is the i-
th asset’s marginal risk premium, which is defined as a deduction from “the yield of 
those assets which, on account of the uncertainty of future value (or return) in terms 
of money, or on account of their marketability, carry a risk premium for which this 
yield must compensate.” (Kaldor 1980). 
The own-interest of money-interest of the i-th asset is: 
  iii i i R aqcr = +−−  (1) 
where ai is the appreciation or depreciation of the i-th asset in terms of money. 
If there exist n assets in the economy, equilibrium is realized when the assets’ 
                                                 
7 The “essential properties” of money are: it has a zero, or very small, elasticity of production; a zero, 
or very small, elasticity of substitution; a negligible carrying cost (Keynes 1936).  
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own-rates of money-interest are equal, i.e., 
 
() ,1 , 2 , , ;





As to money (the m-th asset), it is the economy’s unit of account and cannot 
appreciate or depreciate in terms of itself (am = 0). Moreover, as there is no 
uncertainty about its future value and it is perfectly marketable, money has a nil 
marginal risk premium (rm = 0). Money’s carrying cost is negligible and, for 
simplicity, it can be considered as nil (cm = 0). The yield of money in terms of itself, 
qm, is defined by Kaldor as the “convenience yield” of money, which derives from 
money being the medium of exchange.
8 Thus, 
  mm R q =  (3) 
The nearest substitute for money is short-term bills (the b-th asset), however they 
cannot be used as a means of payment. They have a small risk premium (fairly 
insensitive to their quantity); their carrying cost can be assumed to be nil. Finally, 
short-term bills have also a negligible or nil expected price change. Therefore, 
  bb b R qr = −  (4) 
In equilibrium, it must be Rm = Rb, that is to say 
  mb b qq r = −  (5) 
rb sets the lower limit to the bill-rate of interest. When the marginal convenience yield 
of money, qm, falls to zero,
9 the bill-own rate of interest (qb) reduces to rb.
10 
Kaldor then turns to the determination of the long-term interest rate by 
adopting Hicks’s theory of long-term interest rates (Hicks 1946).
11 Neither qm nor Rb 
                                                 
8 The convenience yield of money is similar to the “convenience yield of wheat to the miller or stocks 
of cotton to the yarn-maker”. The convenience yield of money depends on the ratio of the money stock 
to the volume of money payments. It falls to zero when the ratio exceeds a certain critical value 
(Kaldor 1980). 
9 Because the amount of money in circulation exceeds its critical level (see the previous footnote). 
10 For Kaldor, in a modern economy, it is the central bank that fixes the short-term rate Rb by adjusting 
the supply of money to the public’s demand for it (Kaldor 1980). In other words, the supply of money 
is an endogenous variable, determined by the central bank’s target rate and the public’s demand for 
money.  
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depend on expectations on future interest rates, but this is not the case of the long-
term rate, Rl, which depends on the current short-term rate, the expected future short-
term rates, and risk premia. Kaldor analyzes how the long-term interest rate defined as 
such sets the standard for all the other rates in the economy. 
If it is assumed that the expected prices of reproducible assets are given by 
their long-period supply prices (their normal prices), an asset is produced only when 
its current price is higher than its supply price, i.e., when a is positive. When, for an 
asset, a = 0, its current price is equal to its expected price (its normal price) and, 
hence, the marginal efficiency of the asset,
12 its own-rate of own-interest, and its own-
rate of money-interest are all equal. 
In this framework, the general level of the own-rates of money-interest is set 
by the greatest of the own-rates of own-interest among those assets whose own-rate of 
money-interest (Ri) cannot vary with respect to their own-rate of own-interest (qi – ci 
– ri). The only asset with such a characteristic is money because it is the unit of 
account and, hence, am = 0: “… all assets other than money can adjust their own-rates 
of money-interest to that of money by a variation of their current price in terms of 
money; while the money-rate of money-interest can only be changed by varying 
money’s own-rate of own-interest” (Kaldor 1980). 
The current money-rate of money-interest rate can change only if the current 
money’s own-rate of own-interest changes. This, for Kaldor, could happen if the stock 
of money in circulation changes and affects qm. However, provided that the change in 
the current money’s own-rate of own-interest does not affect its expected future 
values, the impact on the long-term interest rate is small. In fact, the long-term rate is 
an average of the current qm, the expected future values of qm, and risk premia. 
From this analysis, it follows that if there existed an asset other than money 
whose yield is sticky with respect to its level of production, it could not play the same 
role as money (the unit of account). The price in terms of money of such an asset, in 
fact, would increase and, consequently, its own money-interest rate would fall relative 
                                                                                                                                            
11 If there is a long-term loan market and there exist forward markets, the long-term interest rate is an 
average of forward short-term rates, which depend on expected short-term rates and the risk premia 
attached to them. 
12 The marginal efficiency of an asset is defined by Kaldor as the relationship of its future return to its 
present cost of production, i.e., its long-period supply price (Kaldor 1980).  
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to its own rate of own-interest and “thereby lower the standard to which the own-rates 
of interest of other assets must conform” (Kaldor 1980). 
The analysis above was conducted by taking the assets’ long-period supply 
prices as their expected prices, which amounts to assuming that price expectations are 
inelastic. The analytical framework changes if expectations are assumed to be elastic. 
In this case, when the current price of an asset rises, its expected price rises as well, so 
that the asset’s rate of money-interest does not necessarily decrease with respect to its 
own-rate of own-interest. However, the increase in the asset’s money price would 
reduce its own-rate of own-interest; if the asset’s yield is fixed in money terms, the 
increase in its price reduces its yield in terms of itself. The exception is when there is 
an asset whose yield is fixed in terms of itself. Such a case, however, for Kaldor is 
very unlikely. Moreover, to assume that an asset’s yield is fixed in terms of itself 
basically amounts to assuming that such asset is the economy’s standard of value.  
Thus, Kaldor’s general conclusion is that money “rules the roost” because it is 
the asset whose “price” cannot vary. Therefore, “the kind of liquidity preference 
which is capable of setting a limit to the level of employment is inherently associated 
with the commodity which serves as the unit of account, and cannot reside in an asset 
other than money.” The money interest rate cannot become negative and this sets a 
limit to the profitable production of real assets and, hence, employment (Kaldor 
1980).
13 
Kaldor’s analysis of why money “rules the roost” relates to the current 
discussion of why the central bank can always implement effective monetary policies, 
namely to Woodford’s position in the debate.
14 In both cases, “one dollar is always 
one dollar,” that is to say money administered by the central bank is the economy’s 
unit of account. Woodford finds in Wicksell’s notion of a pure credit economy the 
theoretical inspiration for his analysis of monetary policy (Woodford 2003). 
                                                 
13 However, a tax on money holdings or a continuous increase in prices and wages could have the same 
effect as a negative money-interest rate, so that “a sufficient level of investment to secure full 
employment could always be ensured.” (Kaldor 1980) 
14 There are, however, also differences between Kaldor’s analytical framework and the framework to 
which the current debate refers. In particular, Kaldor assumes that money is demanded as a medium of 
exchange, i.e., it has a convenience yield that derives from its use in transactions. In the current debate, 
attention is concentrated on the demand for base money in its function of commercial banks’ reserve at 
the central bank, while it is accepted that the demand for money as a medium of exchange might 
vanish.  
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Consideration of Kaldor’s contribution shows that an inspiration for the sort of 
position taken by Woodford can be also found in the Keynesian tradition. 
 
IV. SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE NATURE OF MONEY 
AND ITS “FUTURE” 
 
Both in Kaldor’s analysis of general equilibrium in a monetary economy and in 
Woodford’s analysis of the working of modern payment systems, money and central 
banks “rule the roost” because money — the central banks’ liability — is the 
economy’s unit of account. Emphasizing the function of money as the economy’s unit 
of account has important theoretical implications, which are not always given 
sufficient attention by many participants in the current debates on money and central 
banking. 
First of all, it can be argued that, in so far as the central bank’s liability is the 
economy’s unit of account, there necessarily is a positive demand for it. The 
economy’s unit of account is also its ultimate means of payment, i.e., the instrument 
by which final payments and settlements are made. Contracts are expressed and 
enforced by law in money. They can be underwritten by using any type of instrument 
as a specific unit of account but, ultimately, the payee can claim the payment in 
money if the payer does not fulfill his/her contractual obligations. In this sense, the 
central bank’s liability is fully money, whereas any other instrument is quasi-money 
(Hicks 1989).
15 The instrument that plays the role of unit of account is also the 
instrument that agents trust more than any other. 
Trust is a fundamental factor in the explanation of money and its origins. The 
agents in the economy accept an instrument as money in so far as they believe that 
everyone in the market will accept this instrument. Historically, the instrument 
universally accepted and used as the ultimate means of payment has become the 
central banks’ liability. In fact, central banks can offer guarantees that no other agent 
                                                 
15 Goodhart takes a partially different position — the economy’s unit of account is not necessarily the 
means of payment, but it is efficient to treat the means of payment as the economy’s unit of account 
(Goodhart 1989).  
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can.
16 It is for these reasons that, in the “world in which we live,” the instrument that 
functions as the unit of account is not merely a numeraire,
17 but there is a positive 
demand for it. In the real world, there arise situations in which the agents demand 
fully money rather than quasi-money. Such situations arise when the degree of 
confidence and trust among agents declines drastically. At the individual level, this 
happens whenever a certain contract is not fulfilled and the trust implicit in it 
disappears, so that the payee demands money to discharge the payer’s obligations. 
More importantly, the lack of trust and confidence can become a systemic 
phenomenon. Severe economic shocks that lead to a general crisis are situations in 
which the demand for fully money is not only positive but significantly large. In such 
situations agents trust only, or almost only, the central bank’s liability that, though 
indirectly, is guaranteed by the state. 
Woodford underlines the importance of the central bank’s liability as the 
economy’s unit of account and holds that the central bank can implement an effective 
monetary policy even in a “cashless economy,” i.e., a frictionless world in which it is 
rational for an agent not to demand money. But Woodford fails to point out that the 
central bank’s liability being the unit of account also implies that it is the economy’s 
ultimate means of payment and, hence, there is a positive demand for it, regardless of 
the existence of the sort of “frictions” that he takes into account. Also Friedman, in 
discussing the possibility of decoupling at the margin, does not consider that it is the 
function of money as unit of account that makes its displacement an unlikely outcome 
as the demand for it remains positive in actual market economies. Laidler takes a 
different position and points out that there are “… situations arising from time to time, 
in which information about the ability of counter-parties to meet their obligations 
suddenly becomes unusually hard and expensive to obtain, and under such 
circumstances we should expect a positive demand for stocks of precautionary 
balances on the part of banks to reappear for as long as those circumstances persist.” 
                                                 
16 Hicks (1989) succinctly explains why it is so. Giannini (2004) explains the emergence and the 
existence of central banks by the necessity to support the economy’s trust in the instrument that is 
adopted and used as money. On the origins and the evolution of central banks as a complex social, 
institutional, and economic process, see also Goodhart (1988). 
17 Hicks, who holds that the representative transaction is one that implies a contract between the parties 
and promises of payment and delivery, prefers to use the term “standard of value” instead of unit of 
account, in order to stress that money (the standard) is more than merely the economy’s numeraire 
(Hicks 1989).  
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As an example of such a situation, Laidler refers to September 11 in the United States 
but, for him, it is not hard to imagine that “the threat of a panic arising from reasons 
endogenous to the workings of financial markets might also generate such a demand 
for reserves” (Laidler 2004). 
In conclusion, in a market economy in “normal” conditions, transactions can 
be made by using whatever, if any, instrument the agents regard as efficient. In these 
conditions, the demand for the instrument that is the standard of value can be very 
little, if not nil. Money plays a similar role to that it plays in economic models with 
the assumptions of certainty and no imperfections and transactions frictions, i.e. it is a 
mere numeraire. .During critical situations, however, the demand for money can 
become significant. The central bank’s liability is seen by the economy as the 
instrument that can be trusted most. 
In principle, however, money “as we know it” could be displaced by another 
new instrument. If this new instrument were not issued and administered by the 
central bank, the latter would lose its power and ability to affect the behavior of the 
economic agents through monetary policy. In other words, this instrument could 
become the new economy’s unit of account and its issuer(s) could come to play the 
same role as today’s central banks. In the literature, such a possibility has been 
considered and different conclusions have been reached. Here, we concentrate on 
those positions that underline the existence of significant obstacles to a process of 
displacement of money and central banks. These obstacles essentially derive from the 
existence of externalities and network effects that characterize money both as medium 
of exchange and as unit of account.
18 
The displacement of conventional money faces, first of all, a certain degree of 
“inertia,” which is due to a possibly high “switching cost” (the cost implied by 
moving from one instrument to another) and a problem of coordination. The new 
instrument can actually be more efficient than the old only if it is adopted by a large 
number of agents in the economy, but no single agent knows when and if the others 
are going to switch to the new medium, so that the probability that nobody will adopt 
                                                 
18 Dow and Smithin (1999) provide a useful short survey of those positions that, not necessarily for the 
same theoretical reasons, see the displacement of money and central banks as possible and/or desirable. 
See also Holthausen and Monnet (2003).  
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the new instrument is high.
19 The obstacles to displacement exist both for 
conventional money as a medium of exchange and as the economy’s unit of account. 
They, however, are more relevant and stronger in the case of the passage from a 
standard to a new one, because externalities and network effects are more significant 
when we consider this function of money (Krueger 1999).
20 
The considerations above can be expressed in more general terms by 
emphasizing the social nature of money. To stress the importance of trust and 
confidence in the analysis and explanation of money and central banks makes it quite 
natural to characterize money as a “social relation,” from which externalities and 
network effects derive. The emergence and adoption of money is the outcome of 
complex social and economic processes and not, like in the Mengerian approach 
(Menger 1892), of a spontaneous evolution from barter, driven by individual 
optimizing behavior.
21 If money is seen as a “social relation,” it cannot be displaced 
— either by agents’ spontaneous choices or by technological innovations. This does 
not imply that the displacement of money, and central banks that administer it, is 
impossible altogether. The crisis affecting an economy can be so severe that not even 
the instrument backed by the central bank is trusted by agents, who thus switch to an 
alternative money. Phenomena of hyperinflation and/or social and economic turmoil 
that lead to the adoption of a foreign currency as the economy’s medium of exchange 
and unit of account (e.g., cases of dollarization) are obvious examples. If such 
extreme situations are not considered, the displacement of the currently adopted 
currency would require some form of “exogenous” intervention to overcome the 
obstacles associated with the existence of strong network effects.
22 
In any case, the displacement of conventional money is a process that, though 
possible, is necessarily more complex and articulated than the outcome of individual 
                                                 
19 See Dowd and Greenaway (1993). Their analysis is mostly concerned with switching from one 
currency to another, but it can be easily extended to the choice of competing means of payment. On 
network externalities, see also Holthausen and Monnet (2003). 
20 Krueger also observes that different media of exchange can coexist if they are perfectly convertible 
into one another at a fixed exchange rate of 1:1, as is the case, for example, of currency and demand 
deposits. 
21 Recently, Ingham (1996; 2002; 2004) has developed the analysis of money as a social process. The 
chartalist approach is also based on the rejection of the traditional neoclassical notion of money. See, 
e.g., Wray (1998). 
22 Goodhart (2000), for example, points out that the demise of conventional money could happen only 
if “an authoritarian government should decree that it must happen”.  
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agents’ spontaneous optimizing decisions and/or technological innovations. In the 
same way, the demise of central banks cannot be seen as the mere outcome of 
technological changes. There are economic, as well as institutional and historical, 
factors for which ordinary banks keep regarding central banks as the privileged locus 
of their settlements, regardless of the existence of legal requirements to do so.
23 
The sense of the position presented above can be well expressed by 
consideration of the recent adoption of the Euro. The adoption of the Euro by 12 
European countries is a concrete historical example of the displacement of currencies 
previously used as media of exchange and units of account. According to the theory 
of money of Mengerian inspiration, the Euro should have emerged as the unique 
currency of a number of countries that constitute an optimal currency area, but it is 
universally acknowledged that Euroland is far from even approaching the 
characteristics of an optimal area.
24 The displacement of the European currencies by 
the Euro has not been the outcome of spontaneous market processes, but of decisions 
taken by the European institutions and governments. National government and central 
banks have voluntarily renounced important elements of their power for many 




The crucial importance of money “as we know it” and, hence, of central banks, is 
contingent on the fact that the central banks’ liability is the economy’s unit of account 
and, therefore, its ultimate means of payment. In principle, conventional money and 
central banks could be displaced, but to lay emphasis on the role of money as the 
economy’s unit of account puts the discussion of this possibility in a perspective that 
is more general and different from the mere consideration of technological 
innovations and individual optimizing choices. Money is a social relation and, 
                                                 
23 See an interesting contribution by Freedman (2000) for an analysis of historical and institutional 
factors that make ordinary banks prefer central banks for their settlements. 
24 For a thorough critique of the analysis of the Euro in terms of the dominant monetary theory, see 
Goodhart (1998), who offers a chartalist interpretation of the process of creation of the new European 
currency.  
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therefore, its demise requires more than technological change and agents’ decisions 
based on individual criteria of convenience. The recent creation of the Euro can be 
regarded as a confirmation of this.  
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